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Introduction 
In 1870, Congress expanded federal copyright law to reach a variety 
of previously uncovered categories: “painting[s], drawing[s], chromo[s], 
statue[s], statuary, and . . . models or designs intended to be perfected 
as works of the fine arts.”1 That expansion was remarkable for at least 
 
†  Michael J. McKeon Professor of Intellectual Property Law and Co-Director 
of the Intellectual Property Law Program, The George Washington 
University Law School. For comments and sources, I would like to thank 
Isabella Alexander, Lionel Bently, Oren Bracha, Sarah Burstein, Marie-
Stéphanie Delamaire, Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Karen Lemmey, Adam 
Mossoff, Zvi Rosen, Will Slauter, Bhamati Viswanathan, and the 
participants in the NYU CLI IP History Symposium. Images of all petitions 
mentioned in this article, except for the William Morris Hunt petition, and 
of all historical newspaper articles cited in this article, are available at 
http://www.robertbrauneis.net/1870fineartscopyright.htm. The same page 
will provide updates to this article should I find additional pertinent 
documents once archives reopen after the pandemic closings. 
1. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. It is virtually 
certain that chromos—color lithographs—were already protectable as 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Understanding Copyright’s First Encounter with the Fine Arts 
586 
three reasons. First, in sheer length and number of categories, it stands 
as the largest single expansion of copyrightable subject matter in 
American copyright law. Second, the works created in some of these 
new categories—paintings and drawings in particular—were not 
designed or intended to be created and distributed in multiple copies. 
That represented a marked departure from all previous categories of 
copyrightable subject matter, which were concerned with works 
typically intended to be printed in multiple copies: first maps, charts, 
and books, and later prints, musical compositions, dramatic compo–
sitions, and photographs.2 Third, the 1870 Act introduced the term 
“fine arts” into copyright law, and the new categories—at least 
paintings, drawings, and statues and statuary—were thought to 
represent the fine arts. The term “fine arts” was understood to contrast 
with “mechanical arts.”3 The implicit identification of copyright with 
the “fine arts” side of that line portended a shift in understanding of 
its nature, and of its relationship with patent law, as set against an 
earlier understanding of the constitutional designation of copyright’s 
domain as “Science”—theoretical knowledge— in contrast to the 
domain of patents as “Useful Arts”—practical knowledge.4 
Copyright law could not incorporate such new and different 
material without being changed itself, and its 1870 expansion had ripple 
effects across many doctrines and principles, ranging from immediate 
adjustments to quandaries that have persisted to this day. For example, 
the original exclusive rights under the Copyright Act of 1790—to 
“print, reprint, publish[,] or vend”5—continued to be sufficient for all 
categories subsequently added before 1870, with one addition—a 
performance right for dramatic works to cover an important part of 
 
prints, but only if the claimant was the person who created the design for 
the print. See infra text accompanying notes 69–91. 
2. Not all photographic technologies enabled the printing of multiple copies. 
The daguerreotype process, dominant during the 1840s, resulted in 
singular positive images. See Marcy J. Dinius, Daguerreotype, in 
Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography 366, 370 
(John Hannavy ed., 2008). That process, however, developed in parallel 
with processes that first produced a negative image, from which multiple 
positives could be printed. By the 1850s, and certainly by 1865, when 
Congress added “photographs” as federally copyrightable subject matter, 
negative multiple positive technologies became dominant. See id. at 370, 
372. 
3. See, e.g., The Fine Arts, in Encyclopedia Britannica vol. IX 194, 
194 (9th ed., 1879). 
4. See U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8; William Stanley Jevons, 
Elementary Lessons in Logic 7 (1870) (“A science teaches us to know 
and an art to do, and all the more perfect sciences lead to the creation of 
corresponding useful arts.”). 
5. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124. 
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theater’s business model.6 When copyright added paintings, drawings, 
and statues, it added for the first time a right to “copy”—what is now 
the bedrock § 106(1) right of reproduction7—since the embodiments of 
the works in the new categories were not printed. A second example 
involves the requirement of deposit of a copy upon publication. The 
1870 Act had to adjust that requirement, since paintings and drawings, 
and many statues, were not made and distributed in copies. It provided 
for deposit of photographs of works in the new categories, and the 
Library of Congress had to issue further clarifying instructions about 
when those photographs should be submitted.8 More broadly, copyright 
in works that existed as unique originals raised the issue of whether and 
under what conditions “publication” could mean display rather than 
distribution of copies. That issue continued to be litigated a century 
later.9 
Why did Congress undertake such a momentous expansion of 
copyright, and why in 1870? No one has attempted to answer this 
question in light of the full available record of legislative and lobbying 
activity leading up to the 1870 Act. In his wide-ranging account of the 
development of intellectual property in the United States during the 
nineteenth century, Oren Bracha cites two petitions seeking copyright 
for fine art, and argues that Congress’s affirmative response stemmed 
from the increasing social status and organized lobbying power of 
artists, and the conceptual move towards “universalization” of 
authorship—from writers in particular to creatives of all kinds.10 Most  
6. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139. 
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2018). 
8. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 90, 93, 16 Stat. 198, 213 (providing for 
deposit of photographs). That same section requires deposit upon 
“publication,” and yet works like paintings might never be published—they 
were not going to be distributed in multiple copies and might never even 
be publicly displayed. The Library of Congress issued guidance that the 
deposit should be made with ten days of the completion of the work—a 
creative interpretation, but of somewhat dubious validity. See Librarian 
of Congress, Directions for Securing Copyrights Under the 




9. Compare, e.g., Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Scis. v. Creative House 
Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that public 
display of copies of a work does not amount to publication divesting 
common-law copyright), with Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Pub. 
Bldg. Comm’n of Chi., 320 F. Supp. 1303, 1310–11 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (holding 
that public display of a copy of a work without restrictions on copying and 
guards preventing copying is publication divesting common-law copyright). 
10. Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The Intellectual Origins of 
American Intellectual Property, 1790–1909, at 121–22 (2016). 
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of the other attention to copyright and art has focused on English law, 
and in particular on the passage of an 1862 Act that extended copyright 
protection to paintings, drawings, and photographs. It is difficult to 
summarize that entire discussion, which includes contributions by 
Lionel Bently, Ronan Deazley, Stina Teilmann-Lock, and Elena 
Cooper.11 Bently, like Bracha, implicates a move towards abstraction of 
authorship, but locates it specifically in romantic aesthetics, and its 
account of the origin of both literature and visual arts in the imagin–
ations of individual creators.12 Bently cites two other principal 
influences. He argues that the choice to frame an area of law as 
copyright law (rather than, say, separate areas of printing law, fine art 
law, and industrial art law) tended to group literature and art together 
even before the latter was protected.13 He also contends that the 
demand for protection grew from a variety of concerns, but particularly 
from the way the introduction of photography challenged existing 
relationships between artists and the market for engravings, since 
engravings could be copied relatively easily, and relatively well, using 
photography.14 
As will be detailed below, the record of activity leading up to the 
provisions respecting art in the 1870 Act includes five petitions 
presented to Congress in early 1869, cumulatively signed by several 
hundred artists, lithographers, publishers, and others; one ultimately 
unsuccessful effort to organize a group of artists and to draft a bill 
establishing a sui generis art registration scheme adapted from design 
patent law, widely reported in New York newspapers; and two bills that 
were introduced in Congress in 1869 specifically for the purpose of 
adding fine art as copyrightable subject matter. An examination of that 
history leads to the following principal conclusions: 
First, a significant part of the impetus for protecting paintings and 
drawings was actually to ensure enforceable exclusive rights for prints—
 
11. See Lionel Bently, Art and the Making of Modern Copyright Law, in Dear 
Images: Art, Copyright and Culture 331–32 (Daniel McClean & 
Karsten Schubert eds., 2002); Ronan Deazley, Breaking the Mould? The 
Radical Nature of the Fine Arts Copyright Bill 1862, in Privilege and 
Property: Essays on the History of Copyright 289 (Ronan Deazley, 
Martin Kretschmer & Lionel Bently eds., 2010); Stina Teilmann-Lock, 
The Object of Copyright: A Conceptual History of Originals 
and Copies in Literature, Art and Design 85–100 (2016); Elena 
Cooper, Art and Modern Copyright: The Contested Image 12–48 
(2018). 
12. See Bently, supra note 11, at 332–34. 
13. Id. at 334–36. In this regard, Bently and Deazley both cite a development 
that was particular to England, the passage of the International Copyright 
Act of 1844, which empowered the Queen to offer to protect foreign works 
of both literature and art in negotiations of bilateral treaties based on 
reciprocity. See Deazley, supra note 11, at 289–91. 
14. See Bently, supra note 11, at 336–43. 
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engravings, etchings, and particularly, lithographs—as printmaking 
became industrialized and print publishers became centers of invest–
ment, risk, and control. Prints had been protected under federal 
copyright law since 1802, but the phrasing of the 1802 Act assumed 
that the painter or drawer of the design for the print would be creating 
or commissioning the plate (whether engraved, etched, cut, or 
lithographic) from which the prints would be made. As the nineteenth 
century progressed, prints were more and more often created by print 
publishers who would acquire designs from painters and drawers and 
make entrepreneurial investments in plates and printing. Those 
publishers wanted to obtain exclusive rights in those designs, but the 
1802 Act would not let them do that, and no American precedent 
supported extra-statutory common-law protection. 
Second, the drive for protection of paintings and drawings was also 
motivated by developments in reprographic technology that enabled 
inexpensive mechanical reproductions to resemble more closely painted 
or drawn originals. Although the technological development that may 
most readily spring to mind today is photography, color lithography—
a technology that is now less prominent in the public mind—was as 
important as or more important than photography to the 1870 Act. 
Third, it is politically easier to expand an existing scheme of 
protection, with many provisions and institutional structures already in 
place, than it is to create a new one, which requires negotiating all of 
the dimensions of protection from scratch. Early in 1869, a group of 
artists drafted and attempted to promote a bill for sui generis protection 
of paintings, drawings, and sculpture, based more on design patent law 
than on copyright law. It had different requirements for protection and 
a different term, and was arguably better tailored to works of those 
types. However, that effort failed, and what prevailed was the simpler 
expedient of adding new categories of subject matter to the existing 
scheme of copyright protection. In that respect, the debate over 
protection for art, and its eventual resolution, prefigures the debate 
over protection of computer programs and its resolution.15 
Fourth, in confirmation of what Bracha, Bently, and others have 
observed, artists and art publishers had undoubtedly more fully 
developed both their self-identity and their political power by the end 
of the Civil War. Artists were better organized in associations like the 
National Academy of Design, founded in 1825, the year after a previous 
bill to protect paintings under copyright law failed in the Senate.16 The 
larger publishers of engravings and lithographs became substantial 
industrial ventures that employed dozens of workers in large factories 
 
15. For one survey of the debate over how computer programs should be 
protected, see Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights 
Revisited, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1746 (2011). 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 144–147. 
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and developed the kind of economic importance that could attract the 
attention of legislators. 
Fifth, I found no evidence of opposition in 1869 and 1870 to the 
proposed extension of federal copyright protection to paintings, 
drawings, and sculpture. This provides a marked contrast with some 
other proposed extensions. The history of federal copyright protection 
for sound recordings, for example, has been halting and partial, at least 
in part because there was a developed industry, radio broadcasting, 
which had enjoyed royalty-free performances of sound recordings for 
some time.17 No similar interests vocalized their objections to copyright 
protection for fine art. 
Sixth, the 1870 Act’s expansion of copyright to include paintings, 
drawings, and sculpture was linked less closely to English legislative 
developments than one might assume. English law had extended 
protection against copying to sculpture in 1789 and 1814, and to 
paintings, drawings, and photographs in 1862.18 One might think that 
proponents of such extension in the United States would point to 
English precedent, and that any American legislation would be 
modelled on that precedent. That would be consistent with much of 
previous American copyright legislation, which had borrowed heavily 
from English legislation. Yet the petitions presented to Congress in 
1869, and newspaper accounts of the drafting of those petitions, contain 
no mention of English precedent, and no wording of either the petitions 
or the 1870 Act’s provisions can be traced to that precedent. 
This essay will first trace the basic chronology of the efforts to 
induce Congress to protect paintings, drawings, statues, and similar 
creations, and of the paths of legislation in Congress. It will then focus 
on each of three separate streams of legislative effort—the first and 
third involving petitions, and the second involving organization and bill 
drafting by artists. 
I. The Additions to Copyrightable Subject Matter in 
the 1870 Act: A Basic Chronology 
The Copyright Act of 1870’s subject matter additions were the 
subject of lobbying by three organizations of artists; by a variety of 
companies; and by many individuals who identified themselves as 
artists, painters, sculptors, lithographers, engravers, foundrymen, 
printers, publishers, and editors. That lobbying was channeled through 
five petitions that reached the Senate and the House in early 1869, 
spanning the last days of the 40th Congress and the first days of the 
 
17. See, e.g., Brian Day, The Super Brawl: The History and Future of the 
Sound Recording Performance Right, 16 Mich. Telecomms. Tech. L. 
Rev. 179, 184 (2009). 
18. See Models and Busts Act 1798, 38 Geo. 3 c. 71; Sculpture Copyright Act 
1814, 54 Geo. 3 c. 56; Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68. 
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41st, as well as through one effort to draft and promote a bill that was 
never introduced in Congress. Four of the five petitions used the same 
text, because the National Academy of Design drafted one petition and 
then was able to induce institutions and individuals based in 
Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Boston to submit identical petitions. As 
a result, there were three distinct streams of legislative effort: 
 
• The “Prang petition”: a petition written by lithographer Louis 
Prang in early 1868, circulated in Boston and New York for 
many months thereafter, gathering 104 signatures of individuals 
and six representing companies, and presented to the Senate by 
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts on January 18, 
1869;19 
• The “MacDonald draft bill”: an organizing effort of a group of 
New York artists led by sculptor James Wilson MacDonald that 
took place in December of 1868 and January and February of 
1869, and that culminated in the draft of a bill for a sui generis 
registration scheme to protect art, which was unveiled on 
February 1, 1869 but never reached Congress;20 
• The “National Academy of Design petition”: a petition drafted 
by the National Academy of Design, gathering forty-one signat–
ures from members of the National Academy and seventy-four 
signatures of other New York artists, and presented to the 
Senate by Senator Edwin Morgan of New York on February 6, 
1869.21 The National Academy also sent the text of that petition 
and a letter soliciting support to institutions and artists in 
Philadelphia, Boston, Cincinnati, and Chicago.22 As a result, 
 
19. See Petition of Memorialists, Artists, Chromo-Lithographers, Engravers, 
Print-publishers, Journalists, Authors, and Others Interested in the 
Progress of American Art, Praying the Passage of a Law Declaring that 
the Purchase of a Painting or Work of Art does not Convey the Copyright 
thereof [hereinafter Prang petition]; S. Journal, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 110 
(1869) (noting presentation of the petition to the Senate by Senator 
Sumner); Cong. Globe, 40th Cong. 3d Sess. 407 (1869) (transcribing 
Senator Sumner’s statement upon presentation of the petition to the 
Senate). 
20. Copyrights of Artists, The Sun (N.Y.C), Dec. 31, 1868, at 2; Copyright 
for Works of Art, N.Y. Trib., Feb. 1, 1869, at 4; Copyright in Works of 
Art, N.Y. Wkly. J. Commerce, Jan. 7, 1869, at 3. 
21. See The Petition of the Undersigned, Members of the National Academy 
of Design, and other Artists [hereinafter National Academy petition]; S. 
Journal, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 208 (1869) (noting that Senator Morgan 
presented to the Senate the memorial of the National Academy of Design 
and others). 
22. See Eliot Clark, History of the National Academy of Design, 
1825 - 1953, at 86 (1954). There may be documents relating to the National 
Academy’s outreach available in its archives, now held at the Smithsonian 
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petitions were submitted by the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine 
Arts,23 the Academy of Fine Arts of Cincinnati,24 and a group 
of Boston artists led by William Morris Hunt.25 The text of 
those petitions was identical to that of the National Academy 
petition. 
There is very little duplication of signatures on the petitions. As far 
as I can tell, there was one painter, Eastman Johnson, who signed both 
the Prang petition and the National Academy petition, and otherwise 
there was no overlap between signers of petitions.26 There was a little 
more overlap between signers of the National Academy petition and 
those specifically mentioned in newspaper accounts as being involved 
with the MacDonald legislative effort; five signers of the petition are 
mentioned in the newspaper accounts.27 
 
Institution. Unfortunately, as of this writing, the Smithsonian has been 
closed to researchers for over fourteen months due to the pandemic. If I find 
new material once the Smithsonian reopens, I will post it at http://www. 
robertbrauneis.net/1870fineartscopyright.htm. 
23. Petition of the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts, Asking for the 
Protection of Copyright for Works of Art, SEN 40A-H11.1; see J. House 
of Representatives, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 373–74 (1869) (noting that 
Representative O’Neill presented the petition to the House). 
24. Petition of the Officers of the Academy of Fine Arts of Cincinnati Praying 
that Protection be Granted to Authors of Fine Arts in the Nature of a 
Copyright, H.R. 41A-H.8.1 (Committee on Patents); see J. House of 
Representatives, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 434 (1869) (“By Mr. Eggleston: The 
petition of the officers of the Academy of Fine Arts of Cincinnati, Ohio, 
praying for the passage of a copyright [l]aw . . . .”); J. House of 
Representatives, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1869) (“By Mr. Jenckes: . . . the 
petition of officers of the Academy of Fine Arts of Cincinnati, heretofore 
referred February 24, 1869, praying for protection to authors of fine arts in 
the nature of copyright[.]”). 
25. I do not have a copy of this petition, but the description in the 
Congressional Globe of its presentation to the Senate by Senator Sumner 
suggests that it used identical language. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong, 
1st Sess. 28 (1869) (“Mr. Sumner . . . also presented a petition of artists 
of Boston, setting forth that the existing laws do not afford to authors of 
paintings, drawings, statuary, and models, being works of the fine arts, 
protection in the nature of copyright, and praying for the passage of a law 
that shall give to them that protection . . . .”) see also J. Senate, 41st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1869) (recording Senator Sumner’s presentation of “a 
petition of William M. Hunt and others, artists, of Boston”). If I am able 
to retrieve the petition once the National Archives reopen after the 
pandemic, I will post images and a description of it at http://www. 
robertbrauneis.net/1870fineartscopyright.htm. 
26. As stated above in footnote 25, I do not have a copy of the William Morris 
Hunt petition, and so cannot compare signatures on that petition with 
others. 
27. Those individuals are James Hope, C.H. Marshall, Constant Mayer, E.N. 
Perry, and Oregon Wilson. See National Academy petition, supra note 21, 
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Legislation was introduced in Congress very close on the heels of 
these efforts—just two days after the National Academy of Arts 
petition was presented to Congress, and three weeks after the Prang 
petition was presented. On February 8, 1869, in the waning days of the 
40th Congress, Senator Morgan introduced S. 914, a bill “[t]o secure the 
copyright of paintings, drawings, statuary, and models.”28 A month 
later, at the beginning of the 41st Congress, Senator Sumner introduced 
S. 61, with the exact same language as S. 914.29 Neither of those bills, 
which I will refer to collectively as “the 1869 bills,” reached the floor of 
Congress as separate legislation. However, Congress had already started 
to consider the comprehensive revision of patent and copyright law. 
When a comprehensive revision bill was presented to Congress later in 
the 41st Congress as H.R. 1714, it had incorporated language from 
S. 914 and S. 61, with some revisions.30 When the bill reached the House 
floor, Representative Jenckes, who had introduced it, noted: 
We have extended the privileges of [the law of copyrights] from 
time to time to other subjects than those originally embraced in 
it. For instance, by a law passed some four or five years ago they 
were extended to photographs and negatives thereof. We now 
propose to extend them to paintings and works of art, believing 
that an artist has as much right to the exclusive reproduction of 
his own works as an author or engraver.31 
H.R. 1714 eventually passed both houses, and was signed into law 
as “An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes relating to 
Patents and Copyrights.”32 
As Table 1 below shows, the descriptions of new copyrightable 
subject matter in the National Academy petition, the 1869 bills, and 
H.R. 1714 are similar enough to suggest direct lineage. The 1869 bills 
change “being works of the fine arts” to “designed and executed as 
works of the fine arts,” but they are otherwise identical. H.R. 1714 adds 
three additional categories, likely out of an excess of drafting caution: 
“statue,” duplicative of statuary; “chromo,” a reference to color litho–
graphs, which will be discussed further below, but which were almost 
certainly already protected as “prints”; and “designs,” which seems to 
denote preliminary sketches or studies in two dimensions, and which 
would already be protected as “drawings” or “paintings.”  
 
at 3 (displaying these signatures); Copyright in Works of Art, supra note 
20 , at 3 (mentioning Mayer and Wilson); Copyrights of Artists, supra note 
20, at 2 (mentioning Hope, Marshall, Perry and Wilson). 
28. S. 914, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. (1869). 
29. See S. 61, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. (1869). 
30. See H.R. 1714, 41st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1870). 
31. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2854 (1870). 
32. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Copyrightable Subject Matter 
Language 
Document Description of Additions to 
Copyrightable Subject 
Matter 
National Academy of Arts 
Petition (and the three petitions 
that copied it) 
“paintings, drawings, statuary, 
and models, being works of the 
fine arts” 
S. 914 and S. 61 “paintings, drawings, statuary, 
and models, designed and 
executed as works of the fine 
arts” 
H.R. 1714 as originally 
introduced in the House, April 
7, 1870, and also as eventually 
passed as the Copyright Act of 
1870  
[an author, inventor or proprietor 
of] “a painting, drawing, chromo, 
statue, statuary, and of models 
or designs intended to be 
perfected as works of the fine 
arts” 
 
H.R. 1714 also makes changes at the end of the phrase that modify 
the relation of “works of the fine arts” to categories other than “models 
and designs.” By placing a comma after “models,” the National 
Academy petition and the 1869 bills seem to use the term “works of the 
fine arts” to modify and summarize all four of the specific added 
categories—“paintings, drawings, statuary, and models.” H.R. 1714 
removes that comma and adds “intended to be perfected by” in between 
“models and designs” and “works of the fine arts,” adding very strong 
pointers that “works of the fine arts” now only directly modifies 
“models and designs.” The alteration weakens the sense that the group 
of added categories are collectively “the fine arts,” and for dedicated 
textualists, that could possibly make a difference. However, the judges 
who interpreted that language, most prominently the majority and 
dissenters in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,33 were not quite 
so dedicated textualists, and so that adjustment did not become 
significant.34 
Thus, we can already see that the language of the National 
Academy petition seems to have been quite influential in prompting the 
language of the 1870 Act itself. To explore other influences, we will 
have to get deeper into each legislative effort and its background. 
 
33. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
34. Id. at 250, 253 (1903). 
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II. The Prang Petition and the Protection of Prints in 
Industrial Production 
The first petition presented to Congress was drafted and circulated 
by Louis Prang, the founder and owner of Louis Prang and Company, 
a printing and publishing firm that specialized in color lithography.35 
One lesson of Prang’s petition is that a substantial part of the impetus 
for obtaining protection for paintings and drawings was actually to 
guarantee protection for prints that were produced in the context of 
new industrial business relationships. Prints—graphics printed in 
multiple copies on paper through a variety of processes—had been 
protected under federal copyright law since 1802. However, the 
language of the 1802 Act, modelled on a 1735 English Act, protected 
only those prints that were made in the context of pre-industrial 
business relations, in which it was the “inventor” of the print—the 
individual artist who drew or painted the design from which the 
printing plate or surface was made—who either produced that plate 
himself and made prints from it, or who commissioned someone to do 
so, thus retaining entrepreneurial control.36 By the 1860s, many graphic 
printers—Louis Prang and Company included—were industrial firms 
that became the loci of control. Those firms entrepreneurially gathered 
images from individual painters and drawers as graphic content for 
prints that they made and distributed at their own speculative risk. 
The 1802 Act did not protect those prints.37 
Providing full support for that argument requires filling in many 
details about the Prang petition; the technology of color lithography; 
Louis Prang and Company’s business model; and the existing protection 
for paintings and prints. In early 1868, Prang drafted his petition with 
a very specific prayer: “We ask . . . that an Act be passed declaring 
that the purchase of a painting or work of art does not convey the 
copyright thereof, which inheres, and shall inhere in the Artist, unless 
specially conveyed to the purchaser.”38 Prang first circulated the 
petition in Boston, and then sent it to another lithographic publisher 
in New York to gather further signatures.39 In April 1868, the New York 
 
35. See generally Katherine M. McClinton, The Chromolithographs 
of Louis Prang (1973); Larry Freeman, Louis Prang: Color 
Lithographer, Giant of a Man (1971). 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 69–82. 
37. Of course, Prang solicited and obtained signatures, not just from other 
lithographers, but from painters and drawers and sculptors as well; I will 
consider their position and interests below in conjunction with the National 
Academy of Design petition. 
38. See Prang petition, supra note 19. 
39. See Prang petition, supra note 19 (showing that the first signers are located 
in Boston); Important to Artists, Art-Publishers, Etc., N.Y. Trib., Apr. 11, 
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Tribune and the New York Evening Post both announced that a copy 
of the Prang petition was available for signing “at the office of the 
American Photo-Lithographic Company, [in the] . . . Herald 
Building.”40 After describing the act for which the petition prayed, the 
Evening Post commented that “[s]uch an act will secure to the artist 
part of the profits to be reaped by reproduction of his works, either by 
chromo-lithography, engraving, or otherwise.”41 As noted above, the 
petition eventually gathered 110 signatures.42 When Senator Charles 
Sumner presented the petition to the Senate, he stated that “[t]his 
petition is headed by Louis Prang, of Boston, the eminent chromo-
lithographer, who has done so much to introduce that beautiful art into 
our country, and I find by looking over the names those of many 
eminent artists, sculptors, painters, engravers, and authors.”43 Prang 
had cultivated a relationship with Sumner by, among other things, 
publishing a chromolithograph portrait of him earlier in the 1860s, and 
sending him copies of other chromolithographs printed by Louis Prang 
and Company.44 
As a legal matter, the prayer of the Prang petition is incomplete, 
and likely reveals both Prang’s lack of legal training and the particular 
problem that Louis Prang and Company faced. To achieve what Prang 
wanted, Congress would have had to do more than declare that the sale 
of the physical painting does not convey copyright, because paintings 
did not yet have federal copyright protection or recognized common-
law protection. Yet it also seems clear that Prang’s petition had an 
impact on legislation. If Section 1 of the 1869 bills began by adding 
paintings, drawings, statuary, and models as copyrightable subject 
matter, it ended by providing that “on the sale of any such work of art 
the copyright shall remain the property of the vender, unless transferred 
therewith by writing.”45 It seems reasonable to conclude that that 
language was added to address the Prang petition’s concern. As regards 
 
1868, at 4 (noting that many artists and publishers had signed the petition 
and those wanting to join could do so at the American Photo Lithographic 
Company).  
40. See Important to Artists, supra note 39, at 4; Copyright of Works of Art, 
N.Y. Evening Post, Apr. 4, 1868, at 2; see also Copyright of Works of 
Art, Buffalo Courier, Apr. 7, 1868, at 1 (announcing the petition). 
41. Copyright of Works of Art, N.Y. Evening Post, supra note 40, at 2. 
42. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
43. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong. 3d Sess. 407 (1869). 
44. See McClinton, supra note 35, at 36 (noting publication of the portrait of 
Sumner, executed by Thure de Thulstrup); Notes from Eminent Persons, 1 
Prang’s Chromo 5, 5 (1869) (printing an excerpt from a letter by Sumner 
thanking Prang for several chromos and praising their quality). 
45. See S. 914, 40th Cong. § 1 (1869); S. 61, 41st Cong. § 1 (1869). 
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statutory copyright, the desire to separate transfer of copyright from 
transfer of the copy was also addressed by the 1870 Act as ultimately 
enacted. That Act contained a general requirement of written 
assignments of copyright that had the same effect as the more specific 
language in the 1869 bills.46 As we will see, a contrary rule was later 
introduced with respect to common-law copyright—ironically also to 
favor Louis Prang.47 
Perhaps just as impressively, the 1870 Act introduced “chromo” as 
a specifically enumerated category of copyrightable subject matter. 
Louis Prang and Company specialized in producing “chromos”—color 
lithographs, or chromolithographs—and Prang liked calling them by 
just that abbreviated term.48 As will be detailed below, chromos were 
undoubtedly already given limited protection as “prints” under the 
Copyright Act of 1802.49 Yet to have “chromos” explicitly mentioned 
on a par with other “fine arts” categories was an enormously desirable 
status signal. Though we have no paper trail to prove it, one can easily 
imagine that Prang and other chromolithographers, whose petition 
stated that it was triggered by “the rapid perfection of the process of 
Chromo-Lithography in the United States,”50 sought such separate 
mention. 
Color lithographers very likely saw themselves as participating in 
the greatest breakthrough in printing technology in centuries, and with 
some justification. Lithography, invented in 1797 in Bavaria by Alois 
Senefelder,51 was the first new printmaking technology to emerge in 300 
years.52 It originally used limestone as the printing surface, hence the 
“lith” in “lithography.” However, the technology of lithography is not 
defined by its use of stone—most lithography now uses metal or plastic, 
 
46. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 89, 16 Stat. 198, 213 (providing that 
assignments must be in writing); id. § 100 at 214 (providing for penalties 
for infringement if the defendant did not have “the consent of the proprietor 
of the copyright first obtaining in writing, signed in the presence of two or 
more witnesses”). 
47. See infra text accompanying notes 97–104. 
48. Prang claimed that he coined the term “chromo” for color lithographic 
reproductions of paintings, but that was not in fact the case. See Peter 
C. Marzio, The Democratic Art: Pictures for a 19th-Century 
America 11 (1979). 
49. See infra text accompanying notes 69–91. 
50. Prang petition, supra note 19. 
51. See 10 William M. Ivins, Jr., Prints and Visual Communication 
87, 108 (A. Hyatt Mayor ed., 1953). 
52. See Erika Piola, The Rise of Early American Lithography and Antebellum 
Visual Culture, 48 Winterthur Portfolio 125, 125 (2014). 
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and even by the early 1870s, Louis Prang was using zinc plates.53 
Rather, it is defined by its employment of a basic chemical phenom–
enon, the mutual repulsion of oil and water, which is why Senefelder 
originally called it “chemische Druckerei,” or “chemical printing.”54 To 
make a lithograph, an image is created on a flat stone or other 
appropriate surface with an oil-based material. The simplest way is to 
draw on a stone with a special grease-based crayon, and then to seal 
those marks. The stone is then moistened, and that water is retained 
in the areas of the surface where the oil-based material was not applied. 
An oil-based ink is then applied to the surface. The ink is repelled by 
the areas covered by water, and attracted to the areas where the oil-
based material was applied, thus distributing itself in the desired image 
pattern. A sheet of paper is placed on or under the surface, and the two 
are pressed together in a printing press. The ink is transferred to the 
paper, forming the same image as was created on the stone with the 
oil-based material.55 
Lithography was introduced to the United States in the mid-1810s, 
and gained significant commercial use in the 1820s.56 The first 
lithographic prints were monochrome, made by a single impression with 
one ink. Monochrome prints would have been quite familiar to members 
of the public at the beginning of the nineteenth century, because most 
of the printed images that people encountered in their everyday lives 
were monochrome, produced by processes such as engraving, etching, 
or cutting.57 Those monochrome prints could be found hanging in 
frames in parlors, inserted in books or magazines, or printed as maps 
or charts or visiting cards or advertising posters. 
Some printmakers, perhaps most famously Currier and Ives, 
introduced color by having a staff of colorists hand-color monochrome 
prints.58 A key advance, however, was the mechanization of printing in 
color—color lithography—which began in the 1840s, and became 
 
53. See Michael Clapper, Art, Industry, and Education in Prang’s 
Chromolithograph Company, in The Cultivation of Artists in Nine–
teenth-Century America 121, 125 n.11 (Georgia Brady Barnhill, Diana 
Korzenik & Caroline F. Sloat eds., 1997). 
54. See Lithography, The Grove Encyclopedia of Materials and Tech–
niques in Art (Gerald W.R. Ward ed., 2008) [hereinafter The Grove 
Encyclopedia]. 
55. See, e.g., Piola, supra note 52, at 126. 
56. See id. at 127. 
57. See generally id. 
58. See Georgia B. Barnhill, Business Practices of Commercial Nineteenth-
Century American Lithographers, 48 Winterthur Portfolio 213, 220–
22 (2014). 
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widespread in the 1860s.59 Color lithographs are made by creating 
coordinated images on several stones, inking each of those stones with 
a different colored ink, and printing a single sheet of paper sequentially 
with all of the stones, thus creating a multi-colored image on that sheet 
of paper. Color lithography became “the first cost-effective method for 
printing in color,” and “facilitated more versatile and innovative design 
styles than engraving.”60 As the title of one book about nineteenth-
century American lithography puts it, color lithography was at the 
center of a “color explosion” in American popular culture.61 
Louis Prang and a partner founded a firm to create lithographs in 
1858. Although Prang himself had learned the craft of lithography, by 
the time he drafted and circulated the copyright petition in 1868 he 
had become a businessman who owned and ran a large lithographic 
publishing company, Louis Prang and Company. In the previous year, 
1867, Prang had constructed a new factory building in the Boston 
neighborhood of Roxbury that housed forty printing presses and 
seventy workers.62 By 1870, those presses were producing 5000 color 
lithographs a day.63 Prang’s firm became one of the larger firms in the 
American lithographic printing industry, but the industry as a whole 
also experienced huge growth. By one count, it grew from three firms 
using eight hand presses in 1825 to fifty-five firms using about 450 hand 
presses and thirty steam presses in 1870.64 
In the late 1860s, Louis Prang and Company specialized in 
publishing high-quality facsimiles of paintings, and it used the term 
“chromo” to refer specifically to color lithographic reproductions of 
paintings.65 Those chromos were produced with twenty or more stones, 
each inked with a different color to contribute to the final print.66 
Prang’s first real success in selling chromos was with a series of 
facsimiles of three paintings by Arthur Fitzwilliam Tait. (These were 
of sentimental popular subjects—“Group of Chickens,” “Group of 
 
59. See id. at 220, 222. 
60. Piola, supra note 52, at 125. 
61. See Jay T. Last, The Color Explosion: Nineteenth-Century 
American Lithography (2005). For other prominent histories of chromo–
lithography, see Marzio, supra note 48 and Michael Twyman, A 
History of Chromolithography: Printed Colour for All (2013). 
62. See McClinton, supra note 35, at 11. 
63. See Freeman, supra note 35, at 49. 
64. See Barnhill, supra note 58, at 214. 
65. See Last, supra note 61, at 25–26. 
66. See James Parton, James Parton on Popularizing Art, 1 Prang’s 
Chromo 1, 1 (1869) (explaining that twenty-six stones were used to print 
a lithographic facsimile of the painting “Barefoot Boy” by Eastman 
Johnson). 
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Ducklings,” and “Group of Quails”—which, like many of Prang and 
Company’s other chromos, earned some critical disdain).67 In September 
1868, the Providence Evening Press reported that Prang and Company 
had sold about 50,000 copies of the Tait chromos, at a price of $5 each, 
which by one calculation is about $90 in 2020 dollars.68 
Because Prang and Company specialized in facsimiles of pictures 
painted by independent painters, it wanted some form of protection 
against competitors copying directly from its lithographs, and also some 
form of protection against competitors copying from the paintings of 
which it was producing facsimiles. I will consider the second kind of 
protection—protection against copying of paintings—below with the 
National Academy’s petition. Here, I want to explore how the federal 
and common-law protection existing in 1869 was unlikely to prevent 
others from directly copying Prang and Company lithographs. 
Consider, first, statutory protection. The Copyright Act of 1802 
undoubtedly protected some lithographs. That Act, largely patterned 
on the English Engraving Copyright Act of 1735,69 protected “historical 
or other . . . prints” that were “engraved, etched, or worked.”70 
Lithographs are not “engraved”—they do not involve cutting grooves 
on a plate to which ink would be applied before it was pressed onto 
paper.71 Nor are they “etched”—they don’t involve selectively applying 
a corrosive chemical to the plate to create grooves or pits.72 However, 
lithographic stones were almost certainly “worked,” an adjective and 
associated verb that seem to refer rather generally to the manual 
preparation of a surface to receive ink differentially for printing. 
Moreover, while Congress modeled the 1802 Act on the 1735 Engraving 
Copyright Act, the 1802 Act omitted some pertinent limiting language. 
The 1735 Act protected prints that were “engrave[d], etch[ed], or 
 
67. After receiving a copy of “The Chickens,” among others, E.L. Godkin 
wrote that “[a]t whatever price, [chromos] would be nearly valueless as 
art, or as things of beauty and of truthful suggestion of nature.” Color 
Printing from Wood and from Stone, Nation (N.Y.), Jan. 10, 1867, at 
36. 
68. See The Art of Chromo-Lithography: Sketch of Louis Prang, Providence 
Evening Press, Sept. 23, 1868, at 1. For the calculation of inflation, see 
Ian Webster, $5 in 1868 is worth $91.65 today, CPI Inflation 
Calculator, https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1868?amount 
=5 [https://perma.cc/J4B6-H3GV] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). 
69. English Engraving Copyright Act 1735, 8 Geo. 2 c. 13 (Eng.). 
70. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171. 
71. See Raymond Lister, Prints and Printmaking: A Dictionary and 
Handbook of the Art in Nineteenth-Century Britain 83–84 (1984) 
(defining “line-engraving”). 
72. See id. at 82 (defining “etching”). 
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work[ed] in Mezzotinto or Chiaro Oscuro.”73 Those last two terms refer 
to two much more specific printmaking processes that are different from 
lithography.74 In the 1802 Act, Congress omitted “in Mezzotinto or 
Chiaro Oscuro,” broadening protection to prints made by all processes 
that involved “working.”75 Lithography certainly involved manual 
preparation and alteration of a surface before inking and printing from 
it, and so there is every reason to think that it involved “working,” and 
that the resulting prints could be protected.76 
That is not the end of the story, however, because the 1802 Act 
had other peculiar limitations on protection, again derived from the 
1735 Engraving Copyright Act. The 1802 Act protected any person 
“who shall invent and design, engrave, etch or work, or from his own 
works and inventions, shall cause to be designed and engraved, etched 
or worked, any historical or other print or prints.”77 Thus, the creative 
act that is protected is the “invention” of an image. That invented 
image is then “designed and engraved, etched or worked” into a plate 
that is inked and pressed on paper to make a print.78 The first clause 
 
73. English Engraving Copyright Act 1735, 8 Geo. 2 c. 13, § 1 (Eng.). 
74. The mezzotint process involves creating a multitude of tiny pits in a metal 
plate with a small-toothed metal tool called a “rocking tool.” See Lister, 
supra note 71, at 84. The pits will then hold ink just as pits created by 
engraving or etching would, and they can be further modified to achieve 
the desired result. Id. In this context, “chiaroscuro” likely means printing 
with two or more woodcuts using different colors, often printing with black 
and white inks on a medium-toned paper. See Woodcut, chiaroscuro, The 
Grove Encyclopedia, supra note 54. 
75. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171. It is worth mentioning 
that the Engraving Copyright Act of 1735, and hence also the Copyright 
Act of 1802, contained the first statutory recognition of what would now 
be called the “substantial similarity” test. Language in both Acts 
prohibited not just copying protected engravings as such, but copying “in 
the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from, the main 
design.” See English Engraving Copyright Act 1735, 8 Geo. 2 c. 13, § 1 
(Eng.); Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 3, 2 Stat. 171, 172. 
76. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171. Many 
lithographers took the acts needed to obtain federal copyright protection 
for their lithographs, recording their titles before publication, placing proper 
copyright notice on them, and submitting deposit copies. See infra note 83. 
Since at the time there was no process of examined registration, however, 
that practice does not provide evidence that any governmental official 
believed that lithographs were protected. Examined registration began only 
with the Copyright Act of 1909. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 10, 35 
Stat. 1075, 1078 (providing for registration of copyright claims); id. § 55 35 
Stat. 1086 (detailing the contents and legal effect of a registration 
certificate). 
77. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171. 
78. Notice that “design” is treated as a step that is separate from “invent” and 
“engrave, etch or work,” and that “design” seems to be grouped with the 
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of the italicized passage addresses the situation in which the inventor 
of the image and the person who prepares the plate are the same person. 
In that case, that person can claim copyright in the print. The second 
clause addresses the situation in which the inventor and the preparer 
of the plate are not the same person, and the inventor of the image has 
commissioned the preparation of the plate. In that case, the inventor is 
again the one who can claim copyright in the print. As Mark Rose has 
commented, that seems to designate creation of the image as an act of 
authorship, worthy of copyright, while designating the engraving, 
etching or working of the plate as mere craftsmanship, unworthy of 
copyright.79 It is not clear, however, that the phrasing of the 1735 Act 
actually represented any such abstract distinction between authorship 
and craft. Rather, that phrasing may have stemmed from the fact that 
it was passed largely at the instigation of William Hogarth, the 
preeminent illustrator and printmaker of that time. That was 
apparently the way Hogarth worked—always drawing the illustration 
from which an engraving was made, and sometimes doing the engraving 
himself, while sometimes engaging another engraver—and the 1735 Act 
may simply have mirrored his practice.80 
England itself expanded protection through the Engraver’s 
Copyright Act of 1766, which granted copyright to any person who 
engraved, etched, or worked a print “taken from any Picture, Drawing, 
 
latter, not the former. Marie-Stéphanie Delamaire notes that the production 
of an engraving often involved three artists—“the painter, the engraver, and 
often another artist charged with drawing a copy of the painting to 
scale . . . and adapt[ing it] to a grayscale.” Marie-Stéphanie Delamaire, 
Copy-Right Secured: Gilbert Stuart, Painting, and Intellectual Property in 
the Early American Republic, in Circulation and Control: Art and 
Intellectual Property in the Nineteenth Century 16 (Marie-
Stéphanie Delamaire & Will Slauter eds.) (forthcoming) (copy on file with 
author). The most elegant reading of “design” is that it referred to that 
intermediate step. However, by 1821, a court seemed to suggest that 
“design” involves the fixation of expression that was “invented” in the mind 
of a painter or drawer. See Binns v. Woodruff, 3 F. Cas. 421 (C.C.D. Penn. 
1821) (No. 1,424) (noting that when a painter paints a painting and then 
commissions someone else to create an engraving of that painting, “the 
invention is designed or embodied by the person in whom the right is vested, 
and the form and completion of the work are executed by another”). For 
further discussion of Binns, see infra text accompanying notes 86–91. 
79. See Mark Rose, Technology and Copyright in 1735: The Engraver’s Act, 
21 Info. Soc’y 63, 64 (2005). 
80. See D. Roberton Blaine, On the Laws of Artistic Copyright and 
Their Defects 12 (1853) (noting that Hogarth procured the 1735 
Engravers’ Copyright Act); Walter Arthur Copinger, The Law of 
Copyright 169 (1st ed. 1870) (explaining that the limitations of the 1735 
Act stemmed from Hogarth’s own practice); Ronan Deazley, Commentary 
on the Engravers’ Act (1735), in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-
1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008).  
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Model or Sculpture, either ancient or modern,” or who commissioned 
such a print.81 Granting copyright to the engraver erased any rigid 
distinction between the authorship of drawing and the craft of 
engraving. The 1766 expansion could conceivably have protected 
chromolithographic facsimiles of existing paintings against copying 
(though it would have not stopped others from directly observing those 
paintings and independently preparing lithographic facsimiles). The 
Engraver’s Copyright Act of 1766, however, never became law in the 
United States. Whether out of choice, or more likely out of oversight, 
when Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1802, it looked only to the 
1735 Act, and stuck with its grant of copyright only to the person who 
invented the image and either engraved it himself or commissioned the 
engraving. That left entrepreneurial printmakers—whether engravers, 
etchers, or lithographers—without statutory protection. 
What about common-law protection? In the world of book 
publishing, there was a robust tradition of developing common-law 
copyright side-by-side with statutory copyright.82 Even if a writer had 
not obtained statutory copyright in a manuscript she had written, she 
held common-law copyright in that manuscript as long as it remained 
unpublished, and she could assign her rights to someone else. Federal 
copyright law had always acknowledged the possibility that the person 
obtaining statutory copyright protection for a book might be not the 
author of the manuscript, but the “proprietor,” who had obtained 
common-law copyright from that author.83 Yet there was no similar 
tradition of transferable common-law protection for the “manuscripts” 
from which prints were made. That is because those “manuscripts” 
would in fact be drawings or paintings, over which courts were more 
reluctant to grant exclusive rights. That reluctance is evident in the 
leading English case, the 1819 decision in De Berenger v. Wheble,84 
which took a clear stance against enforceable engraving rights in a 
painting. De Berenger held that someone who had purportedly acquired 
such rights, and had then commissioned such an engraving from an 
engraver, could not stop the engraver from making another engraving 
of the painting for his own use. “It would destroy all competition in the 
art to extend the monopoly to the painting itself,” opined Lord Chief 
 
81. 1767, 7 Geo. 3 c. 38, § 2 (Eng.). 
82. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834). 
83. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790) (noting that 
federal copyright required recording of title “in the clerk’s office of the 
district court where the author or proprietor shall reside”) (emphasis 
added); id. § 4 (noting that federal copyright also requires “the author or 
proprietor” to deposit a copy of the work with the Secretary of State 
within six months of publication) (emphasis added). 
84. (1819) 171 Eng. Rep. 732; 2 Stark. 548 (KB). 
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Justice Abbott, “[and] in this case the defendant’s engraving was made 
from the original picture, and not from the plaintiff’s print.”85 
Back in the United States, Binns v. Woodruff,86 a case decided in 
1821 by Justice Bushrod Washington while riding circuit, also seems to 
suggest that common-law copyright could not be used to achieve the 
flexibility that the statutory process did not allow. John Binns 
published an elaborate, large-format engraved print of the Declaration 
of Independence, featuring facsimiles of the handwritten text and each 
of the signatures, and surrounded by scenes from the thirteen original 
states and portraits of John Hancock, George Washington, and Thomas 
Jefferson.87 He engaged at least three artists to draw and paint images 
from which portions of the engraving would be made, and two engravers 
to engrave the plate itself.88 However, Binns did not do any of the 
drawing or engraving himself. When Binns sued Woodruff for publish–
ing a similar print, Woodruff argued in defense that although Binns 
had satisfied all of the formalities for obtaining federal copyright 
protection in his print, he was not the “proprietor” of the print because 
he did not “invent” the print within the meaning of the 1802 Act.89 
Justice Washington agreed, providing an early articulation of the 
doctrine that authorship requires fixed expression, and not just ideas. 
 
85. Id., 2 Stark. at 549. In Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 121 (1860), the 
Master of the Rolls delivered a lengthy opinion in favor of common-law 
copyright in a painting in a case involving copying of the painting by means 
of stereoscopic photographs of a tableau vivant recreation of the scene in 
the painting. Id. at 125, 147–48. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in 
Chancery decided the case on grounds of breach of confidence, avoiding 
copyright. See Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 510, 519 (1860). When 
U.S. courts began to recognize common-law copyright in paintings, they 
started to cite the lower court decision in Turner. See, e.g., Oertel v. Wood, 
40 How. Pr. 10, 21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870); Parton v. Prang, 18 F. Cas. 1273, 
1274 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872) (No. 10,784). For a detailed study of Turner, see 
Will Slauter, The Death of a Reproduction: Painting, Stereoscopic 
Photography, and Artists’ Rights in the British Isles circa 1860, in 
Circulation and Control: Art and Intellectual Property in the 
Nineteenth Century (Marie-Stéphanie Delamaire & Will Slauter eds.) 
(forthcoming) (copy on file with author). 
86. 3 F. Cas. 421 (C.C.D. Penn. 1821) (No. 1,424). 
87. Online Prints & Photographs Catalog: Declaration of Independence, 
Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2003690785/ 
[https://perma.cc/D5E7-8EKY] (displaying images of the print). 
88. See Binns, 3 F. Cas. at 422–23 (listing artists included as Mssrs. Bridport, 
Bird, and Sully; and engravers included as Mssrs. Valance and Murray); 
Online Prints & Photographs Catalog: Declaration of Independence, Libr. 
of Cong., https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2003690785/ [https:// 
perma.cc/WY9Q-KANA] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) (listing Charles H. 
Parker and James Barton Longacre as additional engravers). 
89. Binns, 3 F. Cas. at 423–24.  
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A person cannot “claim a copyright for . . . the work of his imagination 
locked up in his own mind, or existing in a form not visible to others.”90 
Rather, stated Justice Washington, he must have “designed or 
represented the subject in some visible form.”91 
For our purposes, the crucial issue is not why Binns could not have 
been an author of the print. (In modern times, one wonders whether, 
with sufficient marshalling of the facts of Binns’s involvement in 
coordinating all of the contributions, he could claim compilation 
authorship.) Rather, the issue is why Binns could not have been an 
assignee of the common-law copyright interests of the artists and 
engravers, and as assignee have obtained federal protection as a 
“proprietor.” Perhaps when recording the title or bringing the lawsuit 
Binns made the mistake of claiming to be the “inventor or designer” of 
the print himself, and if only he had instead claimed to be the 
“proprietor” of the print, he would have prevailed.92 That seems 
unlikely, however, because Justice Washington describes the 1802 Act’s 
requirements as applying, not to the author or authors of a print, who 
could then transfer their interests to another for purposes of obtaining 
federal copyright, but to the proprietor:  
The person then who is intended and described as the proprietor 
of a copyright, is one who shall not only invent and design, but 
who shall also engrave, etch, or work the print to which the right 
is claimed; or who, from his own works and inventions, shall cause 
the print to be designed and engraved, etched or worked.93 
Louis Prang likely had firsthand experience with copying of his 
chromos against which he could not protect. For example, in 1866, 
Prang bought a painting by Eastman Johnson called “The Barefoot 
Boy,” which illustrated a character in a poem by John Greenleaf 
Whittier.94 In 1867, he produced and published a chromo of the 
 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 423. 
92. I cannot locate the recorded title page of Binns’s engraving among the 
scanned title pages available at the Library of Congress. However, the title 
page of Woodruff’s engraving is available, and the recorder’s note indicates 
that Woodruff was claiming copyright as the “author” of the engraving. See 
Book/Printed Material Collection: Image 555 of Copyright Title, Libr. of 
Cong., https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbccpmat.copy0003/?sp=555 [https: 
//perma.cc/7QT9-NGU2] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020); Book/Printed 
Material Collection: Image 556 of Copyright Title, Libr. of Cong., 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbccpmat.copy0003/?sp=556 [https://perma 
.cc/P58Z-KUFL] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020). 
93. Binns, 3 F. Cas. at 423 (emphasis added). 
94. Eastman Johnson had painted the picture in 1860 to serve as the basis for 
an engraved illustration accompanying Whittier’s poem in an anthology. 
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painting, which became one of his most popular.95 In 1873, Whittier 
himself wrote Prang, complaining that a low-quality chromo of “The 
Barefoot Boy” was being offered by a Rhode Island newspaper as a 
subscription premium.96 The Rhode Island chromo was more likely 
copied from the widely-distributed Prang chromo than from the original 
painting. Yet because “The Barefoot Boy” chromo was published before 
1870, it was almost certainly not protected, and there is no record of 
Prang ever having pursued legal action against the Rhode Island 
newspaper. 
There is a postscript here, covering courts’ increasing recognition 
of common-law copyright in paintings after Prang presented his 
petition. In 1870, a New York trial court ruled that Johannes Oertel 
had common-law copyright in his popular painting “Rock of Ages,” 
after he made a mistake in his application to record the title of the 
painting that resulted in him failing to obtain federal copyright 
protection.97 That decision, however, was delivered with minimal 
reasoning, as was the decision of another judge in that court two years 
later that Oertel had lost his common-law copyright through public–
ation.98 The first fully reasoned opinion recognizing common-law 
copyright in paintings was the 1872 decision in Parton v. Prang,99 
delivered by Supreme Court Justice Nathan Clifford riding circuit in 
Massachusetts. Ironically, the defendant was none other than Louis 
Prang himself. Arthur Parton had sold a landscape painting that he 
had painted to the DeVries Art Gallery in Boston, which sold the 
painting to Louis Prang in March 1870.100 Prang then created a version 
 
See Michael Clapper, “I Once Was a Barefoot Boy!”: Cultural Tensions in 
a Popular Chromo, 16 Am. Art 17, 25, 27 (2002). He had first sold the 
painting to a Boston lawyer named Wilder Dwight, and Prang then bought 
the painting from Dwight or a subsequent owner in 1866. See id. at 29. 
95. Id. at 17. 
96. See Letter from John G. Whittier to Louis Prang (Jan. 25, 1873), 
https://edan.si.edu/slideshow/viewer/?damspath=/CollectionsOnline/pr
anloui/Box_0001/Folder_006 [https://perma.cc/A35X-JPP9]. 
97. See Oertel v. Wood, 40 How. Pr. 10, 10, 21–22, 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870). 
Oertel’s mistake was apparently that, while a resident of Rhode Island, he 
recorded the title of his work with the district court in New York, 
contravening the Copyright Act of 1831’s requirement that the title must be 
recorded in the district court where the author or proprietor resides. See J.F. 
Oertel, A Vision Realized: A Life Story of Rev. J.A. Oertel, D.D. 
Artist, Priest Missionary 70 (1917). 
98. See Oertel v. Jacoby, 44 How. Pr. 179, 181, 184, 188 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1872). 
99. 18 F. Cas. 1273 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872) (No. 10,784). 
100. The initial purchaser of the painting is not named in the opinion, but it is 
named in an article in the Boston Daily Advertiser about the case. See Is a 
Painting a Manuscript?, Bos. Daily Advertiser, May 27, 1872, at 2. 
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of that painting as a chromolithograph, and made and sold lithographic 
prints under the title “Close of Day.” Parton sued, claiming that Prang 
had not acquired sufficient rights in his painting to make the 
chromolithographic version. Justice Clifford held that Parton had 
common-law copyright in the painting:  
Undoubtedly, the author of a book or of an unpublished 
manuscript, or of any work of art, has at common law and inde–
pendently of any statute, a property in his work until he publishes 
it or it is published by his consent or allowance, and that property 
unquestionably exists in pictures as well as in any other work of 
art.101 
However, stated Clifford, an absolute, unconditional sale of a 
painting will transfer the common-law copyright in that painting. 
Because Parton did not reserve any rights in the painting, his sale of 
the painting transferred the common-law copyright in it as well, and 
Prang acquired that copyright when he acquired the painting.102 
That rule was, of course, exactly the reverse of the rule that Prang’s 
petition sought and obtained in the 1870 Act. Thus, although the 1870 
Act incorporated a requirement of written assignments of copyright, 
after Parton that requirement applied only to transfers of federal, 
statutory copyright. Common-law copyright in works of art was 
recognized in the shadow of the 1870 Act, but transfers of that 
copyright could be implied from the unconditional sale of the originals. 
That approach was reaffirmed in the 1940s in Pushman v. New York 
Graphic Society103—which looked directly to Parton—and remained 
unchanged until the Copyright Act of 1976 abolished common-law 
copyright in fixed works and instituted an across-the-board requirement 
of written transfers of exclusive rights.104 
In 1868 and 1869, however, as Louis Prang was drafting and 
circulating his petition, those developments were in the future. Prints 
produced by entrepreneurial publishers from designs by independent 
painters were unlikely to be protected under either federal statute or 
the common law, and those entrepreneurial publishers—Louis Prang 
and Company prominent among them—wanted that protection. Prang 
drafted and circulated his petition, and it was duly presented to 
Congress and influenced statutory copyright in the 1870 Act. 
 
101. Parton, 18 F. Cas. at 1277. 
102. See id. at 1278. 
103. 39 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1942). 
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2018); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976) (noting 
that the intention of section 202 is to reverse the presumption in the New 
York Graphic Society case). 
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III. The MacDonald Group of New York Artists and 
the Sui Generis Path Not Taken 
On December 30, 1868, a group of artists, including “painters, 
sculptors, engravers, architects, photographers, chromo-lithographers 
and others,”105 met in New York City “to initiate a movement for the 
protection of their rights, designs, and inventions.”106 The group 
appointed forty-five year-old sculptor James Wilson MacDonald as its 
chair.107 In his comments to those assembled, MacDonald acknowledged 
that design patent protection was available for sculpture, as it had been 
since 1842, but argued that such protection was too costly: 
The expense of obtaining a patent for a large work of art is very 
great . . . The patent laws appear to be mainly intended for 
protecting trade marks, to the neglect of the producer. What are 
needed are more economical and simple means for having pictures 
registered, and increased facilities for enforcing the right of artists 
when infringed.108 
Although we may think of the typical sculpture as an article 
handcrafted from stone or wood, and hence as unique as a painting or 
a drawing, in fact many sculptures were designed to be cast in multiple 
copies, in bronze, plaster, or other materials. Even if the original was a 
 
105. Copyright in Works of Art, supra note 20, at 3; see The Law of Copyright, 
Meeting of Artists, N.Y. Daily Herald, Dec. 31, 1868, at 6. The group, 
which met “in the studios of MacDonald, Marshall and Wilson,” included 
among its number, “Constant Mayer, Wm. Hart, C. Rosenberg, Wm. Terry, 
Gilbert Burling, Oregon Wilson, and others.” Copyright in Works of Art, 
supra note 20. 
106. Copyrights of Artists, supra note 20, at 2. 
107. Id. MacDonald’s sculptures can still be found in locations such as Central 
Park in New York, Prospect Park in Brooklyn, and Forest Park in St. Louis. 
See Lauretta Dimmick, Donna J. Hassler, Philippe de Montebello 
& John K. Howat, American Sculpture in the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art: A Catalogue of Works by Artists Born Before 
1865, at 103 (1999). MacDonald was born in 1824. See id. 
108. Copyrights of Artists, supra note 20. In a report in The Brooklyn Daily 
Eagle, MacDonald’s comment is rendered as, “the present law was made in 
the interest of trade-marks, not in the interest of the artists.” Brooklyn 
Daily Eagle, Thursday, Dec. 31, 1868, at 2. The assertion that design 
patent law was made “in the interest of trade-marks” may seem odd to 
modern ears. At the time, however, there was no federal protection for 
trademarks as such. That led hundreds of companies to seek design patent 
protection for their logos, and the Patent Office encouraged the practice. 
See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, U.S. Design Patent Law: A 
Historical Look at the Design Patent/Copyright Interface, in The 
Copyright/Design Interface: Past, Present & Future 355 (Estelle 
Derclaye ed. 2018). 
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unique, handcrafted item, a mold could be made from that original that 
enabled casting of copies. Thus, it may be fitting that in a mixed group 
of artists, a sculptor was among those most committed to secure 
improved protection against copying.109 As MacDonald commented, “[a] 
sculptor may construct a statue or bust at great expense of time and 
money, and then have no security against his work being photographed 
and innumerable copies sold without yielding him any return . . . .”110 
Those gathered on December 30 adopted a resolution “to secure such 
amendments and alterations to the existing laws as shall afford full 
protection to all,”111 and appointed a committee to prepare a report. 
Several days later, The Philadelphia Daily Evening Telegraph 
reported on the New York meeting with approval. It commented that 
“[t]he copying of pictures and statues by means of photography and 
chromo-lithography is getting to be an extensive and important 
business, and the artists certainly ought to share in the profits.”112 The 
Brooklyn Daily Eagle also reported on the meeting. It noted that “[t[he 
law does not prevent the photographing of a work of art,” and then 
commented: “Since the Courts have decided that the brilliant idea of 
introducing a train of cars on the stage may be copyrighted certainly 
the brain-work of the artists is deserving of some protection.”113 
 
109. On the copying problems encountered by nineteenth-century sculptors, 
and their use of design patents to protect sculptures, see Karen Lemmey, 
Nineteenth-Century American Sculpture and United States Design 
Patents, in Circulation and Control: Art and Intellectual 
Property in the Nineteenth Century (Marie-Stéphanie Delamaire 
& Will Slauter eds.) (forthcoming) (copy on file with author).  
110. Copyrights of Artists, supra note 20. 
111. The Law of Copyright, Meeting of Artists, supra note 105. 
112. Copyright of Works of Art, Phila. Daily Evening Tel., Jan. 2, 1869, 
at 4. 
113. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Dec. 31, 1868, at 2. The comment about 
“introducing a train of cars on the stage” is a reference to the case of Daly 
v. Palmer, which Judge (later Justice) Samuel Blatchford had decided in the 
Southern District of New York two weeks earlier on December 17th. See 
Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552); The 
Railroad Scene Controversy, The Brooklyn Union, Dec. 17, 1868, at 4 
(reporting on the decision in Daly). Judge Blatchford held that dramatic 
works, to which Congress had extended copyright protection in 1856, 
included protection of stage directions or actions, such as the movement of 
a train across a stage and the movement of actors in relation to the train. 
Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1133, 1137–38. The anonymous reporter’s comment is 
fascinating, as it recognizes that copyrightable subject matter has now 
expanded far afield from maps, charts, and books, and suggests that painting 
and sculpture are as close or closer to the historical core of copyright than 
stage directions. The Railroad Scene Controversy, supra. 
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The New York group met again a little over a week later, on 
January 9, 1869.114 The committee appointed at the December 30th 
meeting—James Wilson MacDonald, James Hope, and Byron M. 
Pickett, as it turns out—presented its report, which the New York 
Tribune apparently reprinted in full.115 The report reiterated that 
current law was insufficient to protect art: “There can be but one 
opinion as to the inefficiency of the Patent and Copyright laws, as far 
as they refer to works of artists, and artistic productions.”116 The report 
then proceeds to propose a scheme of protection for art that takes 
design patent law, rather than copyright law, as its point of departure—
perhaps not surprising for a committee chaired by a sculptor, since as 
noted above statues could at that time be protected under design 
patents, but could not be copyrighted.117 
At the January 9th meeting, a larger committee of five persons was 
appointed to draft the language of a bill that the group would then 
endeavor to have introduced in Congress.118 That draft bill would be 
presented to the group at a meeting on February 1st.119 On February 
1st, the New York Tribune printed the full text of the bill that had 
been drafted, and announced the meeting at which it would be 
introduced and discussed that evening.120 A number of features of the 
draft are particularly interesting: 
 
• Invention, Production, Design—not Authorship. First, the draft 
bill refers to the act of creation that will give rise to protection 
as “invent[ing] or produc[ing] . . . any new and original 
design.”121 That language is clearly copied from the 1842 Design 
Patent Act.122 However, it is also a good reminder that the 
Copyright Act of 1802, the Copyright Act of 1831, and 
eventually the Copyright Act of 1870 also use the terms 
“invent,” “design,” or “invention” and “designer,” in connection 
with engravings or prints, and in the 1870 Act, paintings, 
 
114. Protection of Works of Art, N.Y. Trib., Jan. 11, 1869, at 8. 





120. Copyright for Works of Art, supra note 20, at 8. 
121. Id. 
122. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544. 
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drawings, and statues.123 In nineteenth-century American law, 
visual artists are not yet “authors.” 
• Examined Registration Scheme. Second, the draft bill 
contemplates the creation of a registration scheme for any 
eligible design that is created as a “painting, statue, bust, 
medallion, basso-relievo, intaglio, engraving, etching, photo–
graph, lithograph, or other artistic design.”124 The bill 
designates every federal District Court clerk a “Register of Fine 
Arts,” who would “receive and examine all artistic works, de–
signs, or artistic productions,” and “grant certificates of registry 
according to the provisions of this Act.”125 
• Variable Length, Extendable Term with Graduated Fees. Third, 
the draft bill provides that applicants can choose a term of five, 
ten, or twenty years of protection, for which the fees would be 
$1.50, $2.50, and $3.50 respectively, and that any applicant who 
initially chose less than the maximum term could later pay for 
term extension.126 This is also a modification of the design 
patent scheme, which at the time (from 1861 to 1982) provided 
for an election of term of three-and-a-half, seven, or fourteen 
years for $10, $15, and $30 respectively, and a possibility of 
renewing for another seven years.127 Though the proposed terms 
were thus longer than the terms for design patents, and the fees 
lower, the terms were shorter than the maximum copyright 
term of forty-two years (a twenty-eight-year initial term and a 
fourteen-year renewal term), and the fees higher than the 
copyright recording fee of 50 cents.128 
• No Notice or Marking Requirement. Fourth, unlike either the 
existing Design Patent Act or Copyright Act at the time, the 
 
123. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (referring to persons “who 
shall invent and design, engrave, etch or work, or from his own works and 
inventions, shall cause to be designed and engraved, etched or worked, any 
historical or other print or prints”); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 
436, 436 (“invent, design”); id. § 2 (“inventor, designer”); Act of July 8, 
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (“inventor, designer”). 
124. Copyright for Works of Art, supra note 20, at 8. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 11, 12 Stat. 246, 248. In 1982, the term of 
design patents was changed to seventeen years from the date of grant. See 
Patent Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 16, 96 Stat. 317, 321. 
128. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 2, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (explaining twenty-
eight-year initial term for copyrights in § 1, fourteen-year renewal term in 
§ 2); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 436, 437 (explaining fifty-cent 
fee for recording title of a work). 
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draft bill has no requirement of placing copyright notice on or 
otherwise “marking” copies of the protected designs.129 
 
In a number of respects, this tailored scheme might have been 
better suited for the protection of visual artists than the scheme that 
was in place for the protection of books, charts, maps, and the like—
the existing federal copyright law. For example, many artists may not 
have felt that they needed the forty-two-year maximum term of 
copyright, and may have appreciated the ability to imitate other 
artworks less than forty-two years after they were created without fear 
of provoking infringement suits. Artists would also almost certainly 
have appreciated the lack of a notice or marking requirement. The 
Copyright Act of 1831 required a phrase of over twenty words long to 
be placed “on the face” of a map, chart, musical composition, print, 
cut, or engraving.130 The 1870 Act required a phrase of similar length 
to be placed on “the face or front [of copies of copyrighted works,] or 
on the face of the substance on which the same shall be mounted.”131 
The practical and aesthetic difficulties of placing such a lengthy notice 
on the face of a painting or drawing led a group of Boston artists to 
petition Congress in early 1873 to streamline the notice requirement, to 
include only the word “Copyright,” the year that copyright was 
obtained, and the name of the claimant.132 Congress did eventually act 
on that suggestion—but not until over thirty-five years later, in the 
Copyright Act of 1909.133 
In spite of its potential advantages, however, the legislative effort 
of James Wilson MacDonald and his fellow New York artists failed. I 
can find no record of what happened at or after the February 1st 
meeting at which the draft bill was supposed to be discussed. On that 
very same day, officers and members of the National Academy of Design 
signed and dated their petition to add new categories of copyrightable 
subject matter to the existing copyright scheme.134 Within the next few 
 
129. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 6, 5 Stat. 543, 544–45 (providing for 
penalty for failure to mark patented articles); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 
§ 5, 4 Stat. 436, 437 (requiring copyright notice on each published copy 
of a work). 
130. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 5, 4 Stat. 436, 437. 
131. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 97, 16 Stat. 198, 214. 
132. See Petition of Artists and Members of the Boston Art Club for an 
Amendment of the Law of Copyright to Protect Their Works of Design and 
Painting, presented to the Senate by Sen. Samuel Hooper (Dec. 31, 1872) 
[hereinafter Boston Art Club petition], http://www.robertbrauneis.net/ 
1870copyrightfinearts/petitions/bacpetition.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN6E-
VM27]. 
133. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 18, 35 Stat. 1075, 1079. 
134. See National Academy petition, supra note 21. 
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days, they gathered additional signatures—at least five of them from 
members of the MacDonald group, so there was some overlap or 
defection135—and all activity in Congress after that was organized 
around the goal of assimilating fine art into copyright. Yet there are 
lessons to be learned from the failure of the effort to draft and present 
legislation creating sui generis protection for art. 
First, protection of paintings, drawings, and sculpture under 
copyright law, and assimilation of artists to authors, was not inevitable, 
even after the Civil War. Design patent law, and the broader concept 
of registering designs as separate from protecting authors, provided 
starting points for an alternative, separate path. (Indeed, it is not until 
the Copyright Act of 1909 that “invent” stops being used to describe 
what visual artists do, and all copyrightable subject matter becomes 
“the writings of an author.”136) 
Second, there were some basic realities of political action that 
weighed in favor of the ultimate choice to assimilate paintings, drawings 
and statues into the protection scheme originally created for authors 
and publishers of books, maps, and charts. To create an entirely new, 
independent scheme meant having to negotiate dozens of details among 
different groups of painters, drawers, sculptors, printers, publishers, and 
other participants in the art market. The report of the committee 
created by the New York artists’ group to begin investigating legislation 
admitted that it “ha[d] not attempted to take up all those questions 
which have a bearing upon and are in favor of or even opposed to a 
registry law,”137 and recommended that the next step was to appoint “a 
committee of ten persons . . . by those immediately representing the 
different branches of art.”138 That could only lead to a tortured process 
of reconciling the different desires of all interested. How much easier it 
would be to join an existing scheme, where the issues of formalities, 
term, scope of protection, and the like had already been decided, and 
to make a few adjustments around the edges. Thus, although it may 
well be the case that many painters and sculptors came to see 
themselves as expressing themselves in the same way that writers did,139 
they also may have ended up looking to the law that already protected 
the copying of books because adding categories to that law was the 
most expedient political path to protection for them. 
 
135. See supra note 27. 
136. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076. 
137. Meeting of Artists to Consider the Importance of Protection to Their 
Works, N.Y. Herald, Jan. 10, 1869, at 3. 
138. Id. 
139. See Bently, supra note 11, at 332–34. 
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IV. The Interests of Artist Organizations and the 
Protection of Paintings, Drawings, and Sculpture 
If the effort of the group led by James Wilson MacDonald failed, it 
was the effort led by the National Academy of Design that most clearly 
succeeded. Language from its petition, with a few alterations, made it 
straight into the text of the 1870 Act. Why did this effort succeed, and 
why in 1870? 
One of the answers to that question must start with the National 
Academy as an institution, and its ability to organize a group of people 
who self-identified as “artists.” For the first few decades of the 
nineteenth century, contends Rachel Klein, most “artists” in New York 
and in the United States generally “remained closely connected to the 
work of the crafts,” and did not see themselves as participating in “a 
distinctive realm of activity superior to artisanal production.”140 In 
1801, no one listed their occupation in the City Directory of New York 
as “artist”; there were four men and one woman who were either 
“portrait painters” or “miniaturists.”141 By 1830, there were two listings 
in that City Directory for “artist”—both apparently for people involved 
in theatrical set painting—while 123 people listed themselves as 
portraitists or miniaturists.142 The American Academy of Fine Art, 
created in 1803 as the New York Academy of Fine Art and renamed in 
1808, was founded, not by artists or artisans, but by “merchants, 
professionals, and political leaders” to promote culture and create “a 
community of taste.”143 
The only previous time that a bill extending federal copyright 
protection to paintings and drawings had made it to the floor of the 
Senate was in 1824.144 Senator Walter Lowrie of Pennsylvania remarked 
that he had introduced the bill because painter Rembrandt Peale had 
stated that he would be unwilling to sell one of his portraits of George 
Washington without protection against copying.145 The bill failed. That 
only delayed the sale of the portrait; Peale sold it to Congress in 1832, 
and it has been on display at the Capitol ever since.146 However, the 
failure did indicate the weakness of any drive for protection of paintings 
 
140. Rachel N. Klein, Art Wars: The Politics of Taste in Nineteenth-
Century New York, 18 (2020). 
141. See id. 
142. See id. 
143. See id. 
144. See 42 Annals of Cong. 417 (1824). 
145. See 42 Annals of Cong. 512 (1824); Bracha, supra note 10, at 121. 
146. See George Washington (Patriæ Pater), United States Senate, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/art/artifact/Painting_31_00001.h
tm [https://perma.cc/SUB4-MQF9] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020). 
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and art at the time. The issue came to Congress at the request of a 
single painter, and it could not have been supported by the National 
Academy because that organization was not founded until the following 
year, in 1825.147 
The National Academy was founded by painters and drawers who 
were disgruntled with the American Academy, and who wanted an 
organization that was run by artists alone, rather than merchants and 
others who were not practicing artists.148 It was modelled on the Royal 
Academy of Arts in London, in part because National Academy co-
founder and first president Samuel F.B. Morse (yes, that Morse, of the 
telegraph and the code) had spent nearly four years attending the Royal 
Academy, from 1811 to 1815.149 Morse and his colleagues founded the 
National Academy as an invitation-only, self-electing organization, 
composed of successful, recognized artists who were supposed to 
represent the artistic elite.150 By 1869, over four decades later, it was 
the established “old guard” organization, criticized and resented by 
many younger artists.151 Although there was at least one member of the 
National Academy present at the first meeting of the New York artists 
group led by James Wilson MacDonald, and at least five people present 
at the MacDonald group’s meetings signed the National Academy 
petition, there was clearly tension between them. At one of the 
MacDonald group’s meetings, the painter James Fairman “spoke of the 
inadequate nature of the Academy of Design. Such a body could not 
act as the proxy of artists. The need in New York was a simple society 
of artists.”152 That new society could “embrace all professional artists 
willing to be thus associated and also students of art,”153 and could 
“discuss and forward the interests of art in all its departments.”154 
As an established organization with a thirty-five year history, 
however, the closed-membership National Academy had power that the 
 
147. See Clark, supra note 22, at 10, 13. 
148. See Sarah Burns & John Davis, American Art: A Documentary 
History 209–10 (2009).  
149. See Samuel Irenaeus Prime, The Life of Samuel F.B. Morse 35–
81 (1875). 
150. See id. at 150–53.  
151. See Clark, supra note 22, at 171. 
152. Meeting of Artists to Consider the Importance of Protection to Their 
Works, supra note 137, at 3. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. James Wilson MacDonald, president of the group, had also “replied with 
some earnestness to a gentleman who was present [at the first meeting] as 
the representative of the Academy of Design.” At the second meeting, 
MacDonald apologized, “simply wish[ing] to disclaim any ill feeling towards 
any gentleman connected with the Academy.” Id. 
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ad-hoc open group lacked. It could call on its members, representing 
the artistic elite, to join together and sign a petition. And it had 
relations with other established art organizations and artists elsewhere 
in the country. As mentioned above, the National Academy sent copies 
of its petition, along with a circular letter, to art organizations and 
artists in Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Boston, and Chicago.155 That action 
prompted responses from three of those cities, namely, the petitions of 
the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, of the Academy of Fine Arts 
of Cincinnati, and of painter William Morris Hunt and other Boston 
artists, all containing text identical to that of the National Academy 
petition.156 The common text of those petitions contains two sentences. 
Each petition: 
 Respectfully shows, 
 That the existing laws do not afford to the authors of 
paintings, drawings, statuary, and models, being works of the fine 
arts, protection in the nature of copy-right; and that the passage 
of an Act giving to artists the same exclusive copy-right which is 
conferred on authors of books, charts, engravings, prints and 
photographs, would furnish a just and needful protection and 
reward to meritorious artists, and prevent injuries which they 
suffer from the unlicensed publication of copies, prints and 
photographs of their productions. 
 Your petitioners therefore pray that the laws in respect of 
copy-right may be so amended as to include such works of art.157 
Though the petitions thus do not detail the particular concerns of 
the artists, even those two sentences contain some interesting hints. 
While the existing law described the acts of creating the images in 
engravings and prints as acts of “invent[ing] and design[ing],” the 
petition refers to the creators of paintings, drawings and statuary as 
“authors,” thus using a language that unifies the activity of writers and 
visual artists.158 On the other hand, the petition does not yet speak of 
“copyright law” as an obviously unitary field of law—it is rather 
 
155. National Academy petition, supra note 21. 
156. Petition of the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, supra note 23; Petition 
of the Officers of the Academy of Fine Arts of Cincinnati, supra note 24; 
Boston Art Club Petition, supra note 132; cf. National Academy petition, 
supra note 21. Hunt, the leading painter of his era in Boston, would be 
elected to the National Academy in 1871. See Clark, supra note 22, at 259. 
157. See National Academy petition, supra note 21. 
158. National Academy petition, supra note 21; See supra notes 10–12 and 
accompanying text (discussing Bracha and Bently on the universalization 
of authorship). 
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“protection in the nature of copy-right” and “laws in respect of copy-
right.”159 
As mentioned above, paintings and drawings seem to be different 
from all other categories previously protected by U.S. copyright law; 
they are not made to be printed, or cast, or otherwise mechanically 
reproduced. Does that render them a misfit for copyright law? More 
recent commentators have spoken of the difference between a “single 
copy business model” and a “multi-copies business model,” and have 
suggested that painters and drawers use the former, creating unique 
originals or limited editions the scarcity of which is controlled by the 
difficulty of making perfect copies and the taste for authenticity.160 The 
normative import of the use of a single-copy business model is that 
copyright protection likely should not be available, since such 
protection provides no incentive for creation of single-copy works, yet 
limits access to them, including access by follow-on artists who want to 
create variations incorporating their own inspirations.161 
It is undoubtedly the case that many less well-known nineteenth-
century portraitists and painters made money solely or primarily from 
single-copy originals that never served as the basis for engravings or 
other copies. Yet the elite painters and drawers who were likely to be 
National Academicians were quite familiar with a “multi-copies” 
business model. As Lionel Bently and Ronan Deazley have detailed, 
elite painters in England often planned to have engravings of their 
paintings made and distributed in multiple copies, and frequently 
realized more from the sales of the engravings or the engraving rights 
than from the sale of the original painting.162 That was no different in 
the United States. Take, for example, the case of painter Gilbert Stuart, 
whose “Athenaeum Head” portrait of George Washington has been used 
 
159. National Academy petition, supra note 21; see supra note 13 and 
accompanying text (discussing Bently on the emergence of copyright as a 
unified, distinct field of law). 
160. See generally Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Case for Resale Royalties, 
124 Yale L.J.F. 1, 4 (2014); Amy Adler, Why Art Does Not Need 
Copyright, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 313, 330–31 (2018). 
161. See Rub, supra note 160, at 5 (“Because copies are a poor substitute for 
original visual artworks, free copying does not significantly harm the 
commercial value of the work. Therefore, nothing prevents the seller of a 
visual artwork from capturing the full expected value of her work in the 
initial sale.”); Adler, supra note 160, at 332 (“[C]opies almost never provide 
a source of income for visual artists. Instead, artists are able to realize the 
economic value (if any) of their unique or limited-edition artworks only from 
the first sale of those works.”). 
162. See Bently, supra note 11, at 337–38 (chronicling cases in which painters 
made substantial sums from engravings or engraving rights, often more 
than the sales price of the original painting); Deazley, supra note 11, at 
293–94 (same). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Understanding Copyright’s First Encounter with the Fine Arts 
618 
as the basis for the engraving that has graced the one-dollar bill for a 
century.163 Stuart was born in 1755 in Rhode Island, but moved to 
England in 1775. In 1793, he decided to return to the United States. He 
was going to get George Washington to sit for him; paint several 
portraits; have engravers make engravings of those portraits; and 
provide for his family by selling prints made from the engravings.164 
That is exactly what he did. However, when hundreds of copies of an 
unauthorized engraving of one of his Washington portraits were sold, 
Stuart could only complain about the sale in an advertisement taken 
out in a newspaper; he took no legal action.165 Similarly, when William 
Winstanley painted a half-dozen copies of a Stuart portrait of 
Washington, and asked Stuart to declare them authentic in exchange 
for a portion of the sales proceeds, Stuart could only throw Winstanley 
out of his house; he took no legal action.166 Without copyright protection 
for paintings, he had no legal recourse. Only when Stuart sold one of 
his Washington portraits on the express condition that it not be copied 
could he obtain an order on a contract theory against the purchaser, 
John Sword, who had commissioned and was selling copies.167 
The familiarity of elite painters with a business model that included 
selling large numbers of copies of engravings based on the paintings had 
at least three consequences. First, if sculptors like James Wilson 
MacDonald were more familiar with design patent law, painters with 
an eye on the engraving market were more familiar with copyright law, 
which had protected engravings and other prints since 1802. Indeed, 
the failed 1824 bill to protect paintings and drawings does so by 
declaring that “the copy right of original paintings and drawings shall 
be secured to their authors, inventors, or proprietors, in the same 
 
163. See Harvey Rachlin, Scandals, Vandals, and Da Vincis 139–40 
(2007). 
164. See John Hill Morgan, A Sketch of the Life of Gilbert Stuart, in Gilbert 
Stuart: An Illustrated Descriptive List of His Works 26, 44 
(Lawrence Park et al. eds., 1926); Delamaire, supra note 78, at 6. 
165. See Carrie Rebora Barratt & Ellen G. Miles, Gilbert Stuart 
173–75 (2004) (describing Stuart’s problems with an unauthorized 
engraving of his Lansdowne portrait of George Washington); D. Chadwick, 
E. P. Richardson, Claude R. Flory & Edward R. Black, China Trade 
Portraits of Washington After Stuart, 94 Pa. Mag. Hist. & Biography 
95, 99 (1970) (noting an advertisement for the sale of 500 copies of an 
unauthorized engraving of Stuart’s portrait); Delamaire, supra note 78, at 
18–19 (describing Stuart’s press campaign against the sale of the 
engravings). 
166. See James Thomas Flexner, George Washington as an Art Collector, 4 
Am. Art J. 24, 33 n.20 (1972). 
167. See Delamaire, supra note 78, 9–11, 22–23 (describing the lawsuit); 
Chadwick et al., supra note 165, at 96–98 (presenting the complaint and 
the order in Stuart’s litigation against Sword). 
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manner, and with the same privileges, which are extended by law to 
the authors or publishers of engravings.”168 Likewise, the 1865 extension 
of copyright to photographs was accomplished by providing that the 
authors of photographs shall be protected “in the same manner, and to 
the same extent, and upon the same conditions as to the authors of 
prints and engravings.”169 Thus, it was more natural for painters to look 
to copyright as a model for protecting their creations. 
Second, at least some elite painters may have been familiar with 
the narrow path to copyright for engravings under the 1802 Act, and 
the resulting problem with conveying engraving rights to a publisher 
rather than financing an engraving oneself. As print publishing became 
more industrialized, that problem loomed larger. Rather than comm–
ission and manage the production and sale of engravings themselves, 
painters were more likely to want to sell the print rights. 
Third, elite painters were familiar with the lack of copyright 
protection for their paintings, and the difficulties that that caused in 
enforcing and transferring engraving rights. Although, as noted above, 
courts began to recognize common-law copyright in paintings in the 
wake of the 1870 Act’s extension of statutory copyright, there was no 
American precedent recognizing common-law copyright in paintings 
before 1870, and dicta pointed in the opposite direction. The 1828 
opinion of Justice Thompson in Blunt v. Patten170 and the 1845 opinion 
of Justice Story in Emerson v. Davies171 quoted the same passage from 
the English case of Sayre v. Moore,172 which stated that it was permiss–
ible for “‘different men [to] take engravings from the same picture.’”173 
The attitude of Lord Chief Justice Abbott in the English case of De 
Berenger v. Wheble174 that “[i]t would destroy all competition in the art 
to extend [copyright] to the painting itself”175 was echoed by Senator 
Elijah Mills in opposing the unsuccessful 1824 bill to confer statutory 
protection: “[A]n act of Congress would have a great tendency to retard 
the progress of the art of painting, as it would do away the right of 
imitating and attempting to excel paintings already in existence.”176 
 
168. S. 77, 18th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Mar. 23, 1824). 
169. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540.  
170. 3 F. Cas. 763 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,580). 
171. 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436). 
172. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139; 1 East 361 (KB). 
173. See Blunt, 3 F. Cas. at 765 n.2 (quoting Sayre, 102 Eng. Rep. at 140); 
Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 624 (quoting Sayre, 102 Eng. Rep. at 140). 
174. (1819) 171 Eng. Rep. 732; 2 Stark. 548 (KB). 
175. Id. at 732. 
176. 42 Annals of Cong. 512 (1824). 
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Painters did still sell engraving rights, but their only means of 
enforcing them was through physical control of their paintings. In the 
pre-photography era, engravers needed weeks, months, or even years of 
possession of a painting to painstakingly translate its shapes, lines, and 
shading into grooves and pits on a metal plate that would produce 
reasonably faithful prints.177 Thus, engravers or print publishers who 
wanted to produce an engraving based on a painting could be forced to 
bargain with the painter, even in the absence of copyright protection, 
if the painter retained control over possession of the painting and 
understood the use to which it would be put. If, however, the painter 
had sold the painting, or had otherwise relinquished control over 
possession of it, the ability to bargain over printmaking rights was lost. 
That meant that print publishers like Louis Prang sometimes paid 
substantial amounts for paintings that reflected their value as designs 
for prints, and sometimes paid lesser amounts that did not. When Prang 
approached a painter directly to negotiate the purchase or commission 
of a painting, the painter understood that Prang was a print publisher, 
and bargained accordingly. For example, Prang bought the painting 
“Group of Chickens” directly from painter Arthur Fitzwilliam Tait, and 
commissioned him to paint “Group of Ducklings” and “Group of 
Quails.” Tait bargained for a royalty—ten percent of gross sales of 
chromos of his paintings—rather than a fixed sum.178 By contrast, when 
Prang purchased a painting from a collector or a gallery, as he did with 
Eastman Johnson’s “The Barefoot Boy” and Arthur Parton’s “Close of 
Day,” he paid a single fixed sum, which likely did not reflect the profits 
to be made from selling chromos of the painting.179 
Prang’s chromos often bore labels proclaiming “Original in 
possession of the Publishers.”180 Those labels may have been partly 
directed toward establishing the authenticity of the chromos, but also 
suggested to purchasers that the paintings were protected against 
copying by other lithographers or engravers, and served as a warning 
 
177. For example, the grant of engraving rights to the Henry Wallis painting 
“The Death of Chatterton” was accompanied by an agreement to lend the 
painting for up to two years for purposes of preparing the engraving. See 
Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 121, 123 (1860) (MR). 
178. See Michael Clapper, Art, Industry and Education in Prang’s 
Chromolithograph Company, in The Cultivation of Artists in 
Nineteenth-Century America 121, 129–30, 130 n.18 (Georgia Brady 
Barnhill, Diana Korzenik & Caroline F. Scott eds., 1997). Painters 
sometimes refused to sell to Prang altogether. See id. at 129. 
179. For Prang’s purchases from Johnson and Parton, see supra text accom–
panying notes 94, 99–100. 
180. See, e.g., Photograph of Label for “Prang’s American Chromos—Whittier’s 
Barefooted Boy,” in Archive, Robert Brauneis, http://www.robert 
brauneis.net/1870copyrightfinearts/images/barefootedboylabel.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T55R-UUDC] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020). 
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to copiers that there would be good evidence that they copied from 
Prang’s chromos, not the original paintings. More broadly, however, 
cultural and technological developments over the decades leading up to 
1870 increased the difficulty of maintaining control over paintings to 
prevent copying. As Lionel Bently and Elena Cooper have commented, 
public exhibition of paintings in museums and galleries became more 
common,181 and hence a painter couldn’t rely on a painting remaining 
in the private home of a collector. And it began to be possible to take 
photographs of paintings—not color photographs that would substitute 
for chromos, but at least monochrome photographs that could serve as 
a guide or substitute for monochrome engravings.182 
Monochrome photographs of paintings may not have been a serious 
threat to painters, but monochrome photographs of engravings, 
etchings, and cuts—themselves monochrome—were.183 In the 1866 case 
of Rossiter v. Hall,184 for example, “the defendant, by the photographic 
process, . . . produced a negative representation of [the plaintiffs’] 
engraving [entitled ‘The Home of Washington’], from which he prints 
photographs of it in various sizes, and is disposing of the same without 
the consent of the plaintiffs.”185 In that case, the plaintiffs, Thomas P. 
Rossiter and Louis R. Mignot, were successful in stopping Hall from 
making and distributing photographs of the engraving.186 They had 
followed the narrow path to copyright under the 1802 Act. They 
painted a painting (now in the collection of the Metropolitan Museum 
of Art);187 they commissioned an engraver, Thomas Oldham Barlow, to 
 
181. See Bently, supra note 11, at 340; Cooper, supra note 11, at 208. 
182. To increase their appeal, photographic prints could be hand-colored, and 
could also incorporate stereoscopy. See the discussion of Turner v. 
Robinson, supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
183. See, e.g., The Little Passion of Albert Durer, N.Y. Trib., Dec. 11, 1868, 
at 6 (reviewing favorably a book of facsimiles of Albrecht Durer woodcuts 
produced by heliotypy, a photographic process). For a discussion of 
photography’s role in connection with the 1862 Act in England, see 
Bently, supra note 11, at 341–43. 
184. 20 F. Cas 1253 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 12,082). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 1254. 
187. See Washington and Lafayette at Mount Vernon, 1784 (The Home of 
Washington after the War), The Metro. Museum of Art, 
https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/11957 [https://perma 
.cc/2TK3-MBFR] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). To promote the painting, 
Rossiter published a fifty-two-page book describing it. See T.P. Rossiter, 
A Description of the Picture of the Home of Washington After 
the War (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1859) https://archive.org/ 
details/descriptionofpic00ross/page/n5/mode/2up [https://perma.cc/WE 
G3-SPS8]. 
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create an engraving;188 and they satisfied the necessary formalities to 
obtain federal copyright in the engraving as the “inventors” of the 
image. 
For those who had not followed or did not want to follow that 
narrow path, however, copyright was not available to protect against 
unauthorized copying, and photography made the risk of production 
and distribution of such copies much greater, because it drastically 
lowered the initial investment of time and money in producing them. 
Rather than invest in having another engraver produce an engraving—
a process that could take many months, and required paying the 
engraver for his services during that time—a photograph and prints 
could be produced in a day or two from a copy of an engraving 
purchased from a print-seller. That gave painters, drawers, and 
engravers an increased incentive to seek a broadened path to copyright 
in engravings, and to seek the extension of copyright to paintings and 
drawings. 
It should also be acknowledged, however, that artists were facing 
threats against which copyright law could not protect them, and so 
their quest for copyright protection may have been in part symbolic 
rather than practical. Photography and color lithography undoubtedly 
depressed and shifted the market for paintings, drawings, and 
engravings in ways that copyright protection for the latter would not 
remedy. Portraits formed a very large percentage of the work of 
journeyman painters in the nineteenth century.189 Portraits also formed 
a very large percentage of the work of journeyman photographers, and 
no doubt some people who would have had their portrait painted 
decided to get photographed instead. Many middle-class homeowners, 
when faced with the choice of decorating their parlors with a relatively 
crude original painting by an unknown painter, or a less expensive 
chromolithograph of a famous painting by a famous painter, undoubt–
edly chose the latter. Those choices pushed the market for pictorial 
decorations in the direction of “winner takes all.”190 In their 1873 
 
188. A copy of the engraving is in the collection of the Library of Congress. See 
The home of Washington / painted by T.P. Rossiter & L.R. Mignot; 
engraved by Thos. Oldham Barlow, Libr. of Cong., https://www.loc.gov/ 
resource/pga.00130/ [https://perma.cc/PP6W-RVDC] (last visited Oct. 
17, 2020). 
189. See, e.g., supra note 142 and accompanying text (noting that the number 
of listings for “portraitists” in the New York City Directory vastly 
outnumbered those for “painters”). 
190. That is not unlike the choice made by many middle-class homeowners 
decades later to furnish music for their special events by playing sound 
recordings of famous recording artists, rather than hiring journeyman 
musicians to play live. On copyright and “winner-takes-all” markets, see, 
for example, Kristelia A. Garcia & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of 
Copyright’s Term, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 351, 386–87 (2019). 
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petition for simplifying copyright notice, Boston painters seem to be 
complaining of such a trend: “It is the fact, that the engraving or 
chromoing a subject, particularly by the latter, prevents, by rendering 
it common and cheap, its repetition as a subject for oil painting.”191 In 
other words, if you can buy a chromo portrait of Abraham Lincoln to 
hang on your parlor wall, there is likely to be less work for painters to 
paint Lincoln portraits. While that is a problem for painters, it is not a 
problem that simplifying copyright notice can cure. Chromos and 
engravings can have that effect even if they have been produced with 
the full cooperation and authorization of the person who created the 
portrait. Thus, at least part of the demand for copyright protection for 
paintings and drawings may have come from a general sense of the need 
to do something about losing ground to mechanically produced images, 
and a not-very-well-thought-through conviction that gaining copyright 
protection might help. 
One last mystery concerns the relationship of American devel–
opments in this area to English developments. England bestowed 
copyright protection on paintings, drawings, and photographs in 1862, 
three years before Congress extended copyright to cover photographs, 
and eight years before the extension to paintings, drawings, statuary, 
and the other “fine arts” categories.192 Thus, the English Fine Arts 
Copyright Act could have been cited as precedent by proponents of the 
extension in the United States, and language from the English act could 
have provided a starting point for American bills. After all, the Statute 
of Anne provided the inspiration for and most of the language in the 
Copyright Act of 1790, and as we have seen, the Engraving Copyright 
Act provided inspiration and language for the Copyright Act of 1802.193 
Yet there are no such connections in the case of the Fine Arts Copyright 
Act and the Copyright Act of 1870. None of the petitions or newspaper 
accounts of legislative activities leading up to the 1870 Act have the 
slightest mention of the Fine Arts Copyright Act, and but for single 
words like “painting” and “drawing,” none of the Fine Arts Act’s 
language appears in the 1870 Act. 
It is difficult to believe that no one in the National Academy of 
Design knew of English developments. However, the National 
Academicians may not have believed that members of Congress would 
be convinced to extend copyright protection to fine arts categories in 
 
191. See Boston Art Club petition, supra note 132. 
192. See Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, § 1; Act of March 
3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (adding photographs); Act of July 8, 1870, 
ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (adding paintings, drawings, etc.). 
193. Compare Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) 
(popularly known as the Statute of Anne) with Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 
15, 1 Stat. 124; see supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing the 
influence of the Engraving Copyright Act on the Copyright Act of 1802). 
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the United States just because England had done so. And the National 
Academy’s proposal—to add some new categories as copyrightable 
subject matter, but otherwise to retain the substance of existing 
copyright law—was far more minimalist than the Fine Arts Copyright 
Act. The latter was more self-contained legislation, with some basic 
substantive provisions that varied from existing copyright law. For 
example, it had a different term of copyright (life of the author plus 
seven years) than that for books and engravings, and differently 
phrased exclusive rights, including a nascent right of integrity.194 Thus, 
the National Academy may not have believed that the Fine Arts Act 
was useful either as precedent or as a model. Two other things, however, 
kept England and the United States on roughly parallel tracks. The 
first was legacy law—the Engraving Act and the Copyright Act of 1802 
did have language in common, and therefore had the same limitations 
against which painters, lithographers, and others were grating.195 
Perhaps more importantly, even if literal legal transmission was 
flagging, cultural and technological transmission had been proceeding 
apace. The concept of “fine arts” and the power of organized 
associations of artists was in ascendance in both countries, and 
developments in technologies like photography and lithography spread 
quickly between them. Thus, it should not be surprising that legal 
developments, germinating in similar cultural and technological fields, 
would sprout on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Conclusion 
The available documentary records of the activity leading to the 
addition of painting, drawing, statues, and other “fine arts” categories 
to copyright law reveal three separate streams of effort, and a variety 
of motives and factors. Entrepreneurial print publishers like Louis 
Prang could not obtain exclusive rights to make prints of paintings and 
drawings under existing law. They wanted those exclusive rights to be 
clearly conveyable separately from the physical objects, so that they 
could assess the market for prints of particular subjects, invest in 
acquiring the designs and producing the plates and stones, and create, 
promote, and distribute the prints. Some painters and drawers wanted 
to be able to sell enforceable rights to entrepreneurial publishers, rather 
than take on the effort and risk of publishing themselves. Painters, 
drawers, and sculptors were also concerned about new reprographic 
 
194. Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, § 1 (term of life of the 
author plus seven years); id. at § 7 (cannot make or knowingly sell an 
altered version of a work as an unaltered version); cf. Copyright Act 1842, 
5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, § 3 (term of the longer of life of the author plus seven 
years or forty-two years from publication, and forty-two years from 
publication for posthumously published works). 
195. See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text (analyzing the similarities 
between the 1735 Engraving Act and the Copyright Act of 1802).  
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technologies like color lithography and photography, which could 
provide lower-cost, higher-quality reproductions of their works. They 
were also concerned about competition from color lithographs and 
photographs even when those products were not reproducing their 
works, and they may have thought that protection against copying of 
their works would provide more help than it actually would. 
Not all artists assumed that assimilating fine art into the existing 
protection scheme for books, engravings, and the like was the path to 
protection. Sculptors, in particular, were familiar with design patents, 
and protection for fine art might have taken a sui generis turn. 
Established, elite painters, however, were already quite familiar with 
the market for engravings, and engravings had been protected by the 
same law as books, charts, and maps since the beginning of the century. 
Moreover, adding a few new categories to an existing law would be 
politically far easier than negotiating a new form of protection from 
scratch. Those considerations, and no doubt others, led the National 
Academy of Design and its allies to favor the incorporation of protection 
for paintings, drawings, and sculpture into existing copyright law. 
Congress followed that lead, and copyright gained a set of new 
categories of subject matter in the 1870 Act. That is of course not the 
end of the story, because the addition of substantially different subject 
matter affected copyright theory, principles, and doctrines, and raised 
quandaries that remain with us today. 
 
